Identity Verification Systems as a Critical Infrastructure by Clarkson, Robert D.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2012-03
Identity Verification Systems as a Critical Infrastructure
Clarkson, Robert D.













Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
IDENTITY VERIFICATION SYSTEMS 








 Thesis Advisor:    Rodrigo Nieto-Gomez 
 Second Reader:    Erik Dahl 
 
 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 i 
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704–0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, 
searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send 
comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to 
Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 
22202–4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704–0188) Washington DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE   
March 2012 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE  
Identity Verification Systems as a Critical Infrastructure 
 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
 
6. AUTHOR(S)  Robert D. Clarkson 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943–5000 
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
REPORT NUMBER     
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING/MONITORING 
    AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES  The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy 
or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.  IRB Protocol number _______N/A ______.  
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT   
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
A 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
 
Identity management systems are essential to U.S. homeland and economic security.  Systemic fragility has been 
exploited to facilitate terrorist travel and criminal evasion.  The widespread dissemination and use of fraudulent 
identity documents exponentially complicates efforts to target terrorists and other persons who pose a threat to 
homeland security.  Underage drinkers and illegal immigrants are common supporters and users of the fraudulent 
document industry.  No single source can determine the net effect that these entities have in degrading identity system 
utility.  
Identity verification systems are large networks, susceptible to degradation, and vital to other sectors of 
critical infrastructure.  Current attempts to analyze identity systems are segmented and fractured.  Analyzing these 
systems as a comprehensive critical infrastructure provides a necessary framework of language and concepts that are 
familiar to policymakers.  This thesis is focused on providing a thorough understanding of the vulnerabilities 







14. SUBJECT TERMS 
Identity System, Identity System Fragility, Identity Theft, Identity Fraud, Terrorist Travel, Organized 
Crime, Critical Infrastructure, International Travel, U.S.-VISIT, Passport Fraud, Driver’s License 
Fraud, REAL ID Act of 2005, Illegal Immigration. 
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
87 

















NSN 7540–01–280–5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2–89)  
 Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239–18 
 ii 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 iii 
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
 
IDENTITY VERIFICATION SYSTEMS AS A CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE 
 
 
Robert D. Clarkson 
Lieutenant, United States Navy 
B.A., University of West Florida, 2003 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 
MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES 




























Chair, Department of National Security Affairs 
 iv 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 v 
ABSTRACT 
Identity management systems are essential to U.S. homeland and economic security.  
Systemic fragility has been exploited to facilitate terrorist travel and criminal evasion.  
The widespread dissemination and use of fraudulent identity documents exponentially 
complicates efforts to target terrorists and other persons who pose a threat to homeland 
security.  Underage drinkers and illegal immigrants are common supporters and users of 
the fraudulent document industry.  No single source can determine the net effect that 
these entities have in degrading identity system utility.  
 Identity verification systems are large networks, susceptible to degradation, and 
vital to other sectors of critical infrastructure.  Current attempts to analyze identity 
systems are segmented and fractured.  Analyzing these systems as a comprehensive 
critical infrastructure provides a necessary framework of language and concepts that are 
familiar to policymakers.  This thesis is focused on providing a thorough understanding 
of the vulnerabilities associated with weak identity systems and analyzing identity 
systems as a critical infrastructure. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Identity theft and fraudulent document production are reaching alarming levels in 
the United States.  The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) estimates place the annual cost 
of identity-related crimes at $50 billion.1  Since reporting began in 2000, identity theft 
has dominated as the most reported crime, and the overall number of reports continues to 
increase each year.2  But identity theft is only part of a greater identity problem. 
Identity fraud encompasses the use of stolen identity or fictitious identity 
information to falsely represent oneself.  In addition to numerous financial crimes, 
identity fraud has been used to facilitate terrorist travel and criminal evasion.  
Vulnerabilities in the nation’s identification management systems threaten economic 
stability and leave a serious gap in homeland security. 
In 2003, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) released a report 
following the investigation of identity credential issuing agencies in multiple states across 
the nation.  Undercover investigators attempted to obtain genuine driver’s licenses, enter 
the United States from foreign destinations, gain access to federal buildings, and purchase 
firearms using fraudulent documents.  They were successful in every instance.3  While 
most think of identity theft and document fraud as an economic crime, this thesis aims to 
explore the extent to which weak identification systems constitute a threat to homeland 
security. 
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7) defines critical 
infrastructure as any sector that has the potential to “impair Federal departments and 
agencies’ ability to perform essential missions…undermine State and local government 
                                                 
1 Kristin M. Finklea, “Identity Theft: Trends and Issues,” Congressional Research Service, R40599 
(2010), 10. 
2 Ibid. 
3 U.S. Government Accountability Office, “Counterfeit Identification and Identity Fraud Raise 
Security Concerns,” GAO-03–1147T (Washington, D.C., May 25, 2011): 1. 
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capabilities to maintain order...[or] undermine the public’s morale and confidence in our 
national economic and political institutions.”4  While identity verification systems are not 
a recognized sector of critical infrastructure, national economic and political institutions 
rely on identity to function.  Taxation, government benefits, citizenship, and the legal 
system are all governmental functions that can be undermined by fragile identity systems. 
Similarly, economic processes such as mortgages, credit lines, and banking are 
equally susceptible to identity fraud.  Stealing identity information or misrepresenting 
true identity allows perpetrators to acquire goods or services without consequence.  
Identity theft victims are often unaware that their information has been compromised 
until they apply for credit and are denied.  Credit institutions, eager to issue credit lines, 
accept the risk of fraud and pass the cost along to responsible consumers.  Writing off 
losses is often less of an investment than persuing an investigation against suspected 
cases of fraud. 
The basic functions of identity systems can be summarized into three categories.  
First, the system must identify and distinguish you from other users of the system.5  
Second, the system must authenticate your identity.6  Current systems rely on token 
identifiers such as driver’s licenses or passports to confirm that you are who you say you 
are.  Finally, the system must determine your level of authorization.7  Having a passport 
that correctly identifies you does not give you the authorization to enter every country.  
These basic functions must work in concert to protect the integrity of the system.   
Identity verification systems are large networks, susceptible to degradation, and 
vital to other sectors of critical infrastructure.  Consequently, should identity systems be 
considered a sector of critical infrastructure?  Analyzing these systems as a critical 
 
 
                                                 
4 Text of the Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-7 on the Homeland Security Digital 
Library website, https://www.hsdl.org/?view&doc=78291&coll=limited (accessed June 4, 2011). 
5 Bruce Schneier, Beyond Fear: Thinking Sensibly about Security in an Uncertain World (New York: 
Copernicus Books, 2003), 182. 
6 Ibid., 183. 
7 Ibid. 
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infrastructure may provide a necessary framework that is largely absent in any existing 
literature.  This framework includes language and concepts familiar to policymakers and 
scholars of network analysis.   
Additionally, what are the common security implications of weaknesses in 
identity verifications systems?  Pinpointing areas of fragility is the first step in 
developing a strategy to counter fraud and increase capability.  This thesis will seek to 
analyze identity management systems as a critical infrastructure analog and will examine 
potential solutions from an all-hazards approach. 
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
In a 2006 article on identity theft, Keith B. Anderson wrote that “The literature on 
identity theft, both conceptual and empirical, is in its infancy.”8  Seven years later, this 
description still holds true.  Many authors have written on particular aspects of identity 
theft, but none have succeeded in completing a singular comprehensive and informative 
piece of quintessential literature.  Instead, the literature addressing identity theft and 
document fraud is limited to specific areas of interest and takes many different 
approaches.  While the vast majority of existing work focuses on economic consequences 
of weak identity systems, few articles describe the threat to homeland security.  This 
review will examine major works of existing literature that address identity system 
fragility and will highlight areas for additional research.     
Personal information can be compromised in a number of ways. The most 
common means of information loss, as reported by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), 
are careless disposal of sensitive information in the trash, mail theft, hacking of business 
records, employees abusing access to business databases, elaborate fraudulent credit card 
scanners, stolen purse or wallet, or phone and Internet scams.9  The FTC also reports that 
identity thieves steal information in order to commit credit card fraud, establish utilities, 
                                                 
8 Keith B. Anderson, “Who are the victims of identity theft? The effect of demographics,” Journal of 
Public Policy & Marketing, 25, no. 2 (2006): 160. 
9 Federal Trade Commission, “Take Charge: Fighting Back Against Identity Theft,” February 2006, on 
the Federal Trade Commission website at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/consumer/idtheft/idt04.pdf. 
 4 
counterfeit financial documents, file for bankruptcy, make large purchases, obtain 
identity documents or employment, and evade law enforcement.10  Many consumers are 
aware of these threats and take limited precautions to protect against them. 
Consumers typically provide characteristics such as date of birth, social security 
number, and mother’s maiden name in order to verify who they are.  But defining the 
unique characteristics that distinguish an individual from among others is “among the 
most elusive and difficult concepts confronting scholars and researchers.”11  
Identification requires a comparison and authentication of presented characteristics 
against known metrics.  However, many of the current metrics are easily spoofed or 
reproduced. 
There are three basic identity verification methods that are widely accepted 
among experts in the field.  “Knowledge based” identity requires a consumer to produce 
information unique to that person.12  “Token-based” identity is based on an identification 
document, like a driver’s license or passport.13  “Biometric” identity uses unique physical 
characteristics to differentiate individuals.14  
Newer and more controversial methods of proving identity are radio frequency 
identification (RFID) chips or location tracking through mobile telephone service 
providers.15  While all of these methods provide some level of security, each is 
susceptible to unauthorized reproduction.  LoPucki explains that “creditors and credit-
reporting agencies often lack both the means and the incentive to correctly identify the 
persons who seek credit from them or on whom they report.”16  
                                                 
10 Ibid. 
11 Charles D. Raab, “Social and Political Dimensions of Identity,” in IFIP International Federation 
for Information Processing, ed. Fischer-Hubner (Boston: Springer, 2008): 4. 
12 Roger Clarke, “Human Identification in Information Systems: Management Challenge and Public 
Policy Issues,” Information Technology & People, 7, no. 4 (1994): 14. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid., 19. 
15 Ruth Halperin and James Backhouse, “A Roadmap for Research on Identity in the Information 
Society,” Identity Journal Limited, 1, no. 1 (2008): 75. 
16 Lynn LoPucki, “Human Identification Theory and the Identity Theft Problem,” Texas Law Review, 
no. 01-1 (2001): 94. 
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The White House addressed the threat to identity systems in its National Strategy 
for Trusted Identities in Cyberspace.  The strategy outlines a technology-driven solution 
to restore consumer confidence in Internet purchasing.17  The Identity Ecosystem “is an 
online environment where individuals and organizations can trust each other because they 
follow agreed-upon standards and processes to identify and authenticate their digital 
identities—and the digital identities of organizations and devices.”18  The strategy 
provides a fictitious example describing how the system might work to request medical 
records using the Identity Ecosystem: 
Keisha uses the browser on her cell phone to access the hospital website. 
The browser authenticates the hospital’s website domain so that Keisha 
knows she is not sending information to a fraudulent site. Keisha has a 
digital certificate issued by her trustmarked cell phone carrier (also her 
IDP), and the hospital validates the authenticity of the credential, her cell 
phone, and her digital identity.19 
While the Identify Ecosystem is supposed to provide a safe environment between 
accredited consumers and providers, the strategy does not explore the possibility of 
Keisha’s cell phone being stolen or otherwise compromised.  Additionally, it does not 
consider the role of hackers in corrupting the information systems that the Identity 
Ecosystem relies upon.  The strategy outlines an initial approach, but is absent of 
contingencies and specifics. 
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) released a statement by its director 
of strategic issues to the Senate Subcommittee on Fiscal Responsibility and Economic 
Growth regarding initiatives to assist victims of tax fraud.  In particular, the director 
addressed employment and refund fraud.20  He praised the IRS for taking steps to resolve, 
detect, and prevent identity theft in its tax returns, but was critical of confidentiality laws 
                                                 
17 Howard A. Schmidt, “National Strategy for Trusted Identities in Cyberspace,” April 2011, 




20 GAO, “Taxes and Identity Theft: Status of IRS Initiatives to Help Victimized Taxpayers,” GAO-
11–674T (Washington, D.C., May 25, 2011): 1. 
 6 
that prevented the IRS from coordinating with other agencies or taxpayers to catch 
perpetrators.21  Bureaucratic limitations constrain efforts to investigate or track imposters.   
 
 
Figure 1.   Total FTC Consumer Fraud Complaints22 
Economic crimes resulting from identity theft represent the majority of FTC 
complaints (Figure 1), but these crimes tend to be relatively small in scale.  Criminal 
record identity theft, on the other hand, represents a very real threat to homeland security.   
Despite this risk, the FTC consumer guide mentions misuse of identification for criminal 
evasion in one section of the 52-page document.  Criminal record identity theft is a tactic 
that has been used by illegal immigrants, criminal organizations, and terrorists.23  This 
tactic allows an imposter to launder his own identity and insulate himself from detection 
by law enforcement and operate with near impunity.   
                                                 
21 Ibid. 
22 Kristin M. Finklea, “Identity Theft: Trends and Issues,” Congressional Research Service, R40599 
(2012), 10. 
23 Pearl, “It’s Not Always about the Money: Why the State Identity Theft Laws Fails to Adequately 
Address Criminal Record Identity Theft,” 179. 
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Organized crime plays a broad and pervasive role in the undermining of identity 
verification systems.  In general, identity crimes require a network.24  Organized 
transnational criminal networks are optimized for collecting stolen identity, converting it 
to a useable form, and disseminating it for sale.  Jurisdictional limitations and the lack of 
international cooperation greatly contribute to the success and sustainment of these 
organizations.  Attempts to dismantle organized crime are largely ineffective without 
comprehensive examination of the entire organization.    Network analysis is essential to 
obtain a larger perspective and identify critical nodes of network structure and operation. 
 Ted G. Lewis defines a network as “a collection of nodes and links that connect 
pairs of nodes.”25 His framework is described in terms of physical infrastructure 
protection.  Lewis explains that “Network theory is powerful because of its generality and 
our ability to apply known analysis techniques to the network model.”26  In essence, 
networks can be described using mathematical probabilities that identity critical nodes.  
This knowledge could potentially be used by policymakers to protect against attack on 
the homeland or develop strategies to dismantle target networks. 
Social network analysis allows network analysis principles to be applied to 
criminal and terrorist organizations.  Once a social network is mapped, “this knowledge 
can then be used to identify key individuals, relationships, and organizational 
practices.”27  Researchers have recognized the utility of social network analysis to detect 
fraud in specific cases, such as Internet auction fraud,28 but have failed to examine the 
 
 
                                                 
24 Judith M. Collins, Investigating Identity Theft: A Guide for Businesses, Law Enforcement, and 
Victims (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2006), 18. 
25 Ted G. Lewis, Critical Infrastructure Protection in Homeland Security: Defending a Networked 
Nation (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2006), 78. 
26 Ibid., 79. 
27 J. Todd Hamill, Richard F. Deckro, James W. Chrissis, and Robert F. Mills, “Analysis of Layers 
Social Networks,” IO Sphere (2008): 2, http://www.au.af.mil/info-
ops/iosphere/08winter/iosphere_win08_hamill.pdf (accessed November 17, 2011).  
28 Chaochang Chiu, Yungchang Ku, Ting Lie, and Yuchi Chen, “Internet Auction Fraud Detection 
Using Social Network Analysis and Classification Tree Approaches,” International Journal of Electronic 
Commerce 15, no. 3, (2011): 123. 
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underlying problem with identity verification systems.  Network analysis and critical 
infrastructure terminology are a start to developing comprehensive understanding of the 
identity meta-sector. 
Government agency strategies provide vital insight as to how each agency views 
identity problems and what they are doing to combat them.  They define the culture and 
specific niche of a particular agency while outlining strategic issues to be addressed.  
Identity theft and fraud are frequently addressed but rarely in any meaningful manner.   
The 2010 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report and the U.S. 
Department of Justice Strategic Plan address identity theft as a cyber threat, but both fail 
to describe identity theft as a threat to homeland security.29  The U.S. Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement Strategic Plan, on the other hand, highlights identity fraud as a 
terrorist tactic used to enter the United States.30  Unlike the Department of Homeland 
Security and Department of Justice, prevention of identity fraud is included in ICE’s 
objectives. 
The Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS), a liaison office 
within the Department of Justice, released “A National Strategy to Combat Identity 
Theft” in May 2006.  Of all the national strategies, this document is the most 
comprehensive and informative.  Most significantly, the strategy states: 
One of the most challenging aspects of identity theft is its potential 
relationship to international terrorism. Identity theft could be used broadly 
by crime rings that may include international members; therefore, 
whenever transnational crime is discussed authorities should look for a 
connection to terrorism. Identity theft demands the most effective police 
response possible.31 
The potential link between terrorism and organized crime has received increasing 
attention in recent years.  Some researchers have drawn similarities between the 
                                                 
29 Department of Homeland Security, “Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report,” (2010): 56; 
U.S Department of Justice, “Strategic Plan: Stewards of the American Dream,” (2007): 4. 
30 U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, “ICE Strategic Plan:  Fiscal Years 2010–2014,” 
(2010):  3. 
31 Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, “A National Strategy to Combat Identity Theft,” 
U.S. Department of Justice (2006): 1. 
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operational and organizations structures of each group.32  Others point to organized crime 
as a source of revenue for terrorist organizations.33  Both groups use stolen and 
fraudulent identity to sustain operations and this link demands additional research.  
Securing identity systems may prove to limit the scope of terrorist and criminal 
operations.   
In 2004, the Economic Crime Institute at Utica College joined with Lexis Nexis to 
study the net effect of identity fraud on global and U.S. national security.34  The resulting 
article outlined the size and scope of identity issues, described many of the second order 
effects, and provided strategic recommendations for managing fraud.35  Although the 
article was extensive, it failed to present a framework for objectively analyzing the many 
core and satellite issues extending from identity theft and fraud.  Presenting identity 
verification systems as a sector of critical infrastructure provides this much needed 
framework.   
C. IMPORTANCE OF RESEARCH 
The problem of identity is one that is often overlooked.  Identity is necessary for 
commerce and governments to function but identification is not a simple process.  
Historically, identity was a method of social distinction rather than economic function.36  
Communities recognized individuals based on appearance, voice, first-hand knowledge, 
and name.37  Developing economic systems changed the scale of identity systems from 
community to regional.  The increase in scale of economic transactions acted to increase 
 
 
                                                 
32 Frank S. Perri and Richard G. Brody, “The Dark Triad: Organized Crime, Terror and Fraud,” 
Journal of Money Laundering Control 14, no.1 (2011): 44. 
33 Tamara Makarenko, “The Crime-Terror Continuum: Tracing the Interplay between Transnational 
Crime and Terrorism,” Global Crime 6, no. 1 (2004): 129.   
34 G. R. Gordon, N. A. Willox, D. J. Rebovich, T. M. Regan, and J. B. Gordon, “Identity Fraud: A 
Critical National and Global Threat,” Journal of Economic Crime Management 2, (2004).   
35 Ibid., 2. 
36 Roger Clarke, “Human Identification in Information Systems: Management Challenge and Public 
Policy Issues,” Information Technology & People, 7, no. 4 (1994): 8. 
37 Ibid. 
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the need for a reliable system to identify persons from separate communities who may 
have never met.38  Surnames and assigned account numbers helped to fulfill this need for 
a time.39 
Modern transportation and communication systems have increased the scale of 
travel and economic transactions to a global level.  Face-to-face recognition is virtually 
obsolete as a primary means of identification for most operations.  Instead, knowledge 
and token-based identifiers are the most widely used identity authentication methods.  
Typical “knowledge-based” identifiers include name, address, phone number, mother’s 
maiden name, and social security number.40  Using this information, governments and 
business issue “token” identifiers such as birth certificates, credit cards, driver’s licenses, 
and passports.41   
Knowledge and token-based identifiers codify characteristics of human identity, 
but neither method is capable of definitively identifying one individual from another.42  
Token identifiers are usually verified using knowledge-based identifiers or checked 
against existing databases to increase resiliency of the system.  This verification process 
cannot account for the duplication or misrepresentation of names, similar physical 
characteristics, and fraudulent tokens.  Additionally, verification databases must be made 
widely available to be viable.  This wide dissemination provides opportunities for thieves 
to steal knowledge-based information that is not easily changed once compromised.43 
 Biological characteristics offer an alternative to knowledge and token-based 
verification.  Fingerprints, retinal scans, facial recognition software, and DNA provide 
technically and economically feasible options to governments and businesses.44  In the 
United States, however, fears of government abuse of power make these options socially 
                                                 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid., 13 
40 Ibid., 14. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid., 17. 
43 Lynn LoPucki, “Human Identification Theory and the Identity Theft Problem,” Texas Law Review 
95, no. 1 (2001), 109. 
44 Roger Clarke, “Human Identification in Information Systems: Management Challenge and Public 
Policy Issues,” 20. 
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unacceptable and contrary to national values.  Providing a blood sample for a social 
security card or credit line is considered an “unwarranted invasion of privacy.”45  On the 
other hand, Europeans are generally more willing to submit to more invasive 
identification techniques.46  Identity systems contain a social component that may vary 
from location to location making it “necessary to balance the interest of individuals in the 
various aspects of civil liberty.”47 
The identity system functions when all actors play by the rules of the system.  
However, significant security lapses can occur when thieves steal personal information 
and counterfeit token identifiers.  Once obtained, personal information can be exploited 
in a number of ways.  Most common is credit fraud, whereby an imposter receives a 
credit line and purchases goods or services.  Although costly, this form of identity theft is 
containable.  A victim has the power to cancel the fraudulent account and dispute the 
charges. 
Identity document fraud represents a more difficult and dangerous problem.48  
Fraudulent documents can be manufactured or genuine documents can be altered.  When 
a valid identity is used to manufacture a fraudulent document, the imposter has a greater 
chance of operating undetected.  For example, an imposter who is stopped for a traffic 
violation can present a driver’s license with his picture and someone else’s identity 
information.  When the identity is checked against law enforcement databases, the 
imposter’s criminal history is protected from discovery while his victim receives the 
traffic citation. 
Federal law prohibits knowingly possessing, transferring, or using any fraudulent 
identity document.49 However, a thriving clandestine document industry eagerly supplies 
high quality forgeries in response to demand.  Teenagers, illegal immigrants, and other 
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customers can access this service with no more effort than an Internet search.  Websites 
traced to China take personal information and payment online, and then ship fraudulent 
driver’s licenses that are “indistinguishable” from their authentic counterparts.50  In 
addition to facing criminal charges, users of this service may be victimized by the 
overseas criminal organizations that manufacture their fraudulent licenses.51  More 
disturbing than underage drinking or illegal immigration is the very real possibility that 
terrorists will acquire and use these high-quality documents in the course of an operation 
in the United States.   
The 9/11 Commission Report recognized that, “For terrorists, travel documents 
are as important as a weapon.  Terrorists must travel clandestinely to meet, train, plan, 
case targets, and gain access to attack.”52  Current identification systems are fragile and 
easily susceptible to manipulation.  In the past, this weakness allowed terrorists to move 
unfettered and participate in criminal activity to finance their operations.53  While stricter 
measures are being implemented, gaps in homeland security still exist. 
In the summer of 2011, Olajide Oluwaseun Noib successfully boarded a flight to 
New York from Los Angeles using an expired boarding pass and a student identification 
card.  The 24-year-old with dual U.S.-Nigerian citizenship presented his student ID and a 
police report to support his story that his passport had been stolen.  Noib was not 
identified until his flight was underway and airline personnel realized he was sitting in a 
seat that was supposed to be vacant.54 
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Identity is a valuable resource that various sectors of infrastructure rely upon to 
function.  Vulnerability analysis is needed to create strategies for enhancing identity 
verification systems used by government and commerce.  Solutions must be 
comprehensive and viable to be effective.  Network analysis tools used for infrastructure 
and social research offer significant advantages over current investigative methods and 
represent an all-hazards approach. 
If documents cannot distinguish person from person, then what can?  What are the 
characteristics that define human identity?  How can these characteristics be harnessed to 
create stronger economic, immigration and criminal management systems?  Answering 
these questions is essential to address weaknesses in current identity systems.  While this 
thesis does not contain all the answers, it aims to further understanding of the problems 
associated with identity systems and spur further research into the subject. 
D. ORGANIZATION AND METHODOLOGY 
The goal of this research is to provide a thorough understanding of the 
vulnerabilities associated with weak identity systems and analyze weaknesses in terms of 
critical infrastructure.  Previous and existing vulnerabilities will be described using case 
studies.  Some of these examples will be supplemented with personal experiences of the 
author in dealing with the consequences of identity theft.  Current policy will be analyzed 
for effectiveness and sufficiency in protecting identity management systems from 
existing threats to homeland security.    
 Chapter II will examine identity from the terrorist perspective and review case 
studies to pinpoint how identity has been exploited in the past.  Chapter III will discuss 
how organized crime supplies a thriving fraudulent identity document industry while 
Chapter IV will explore other common users of fraudulent documents who contribute to 
the undermining of the identity verification system.  Finally, Chapter V will analyze the 
preceding evidence in terms of critical infrastructure while providing recommendations 
from an all-hazards approach. 
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II. TERRORIST EXPLOITATION OF IDENTITY SYSTEMS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Identity management is an essential function of terrorist operations.  The 9/11 
Commission Report recognized that “for terrorists, travel documents are as important as a 
weapon. Terrorists must travel clandestinely to meet, train, plan, case targets, and gain 
access to attack.”55  Consequently, fragility within identity systems represents a risk to 
global and U.S. homeland security. 
  Document alteration and fabrication are favored terrorist tactics since many 
nations have failed to create comprehensive systems capable of checking documents 
against databases and other unique identifiers.  Given the interconnectedness of the 
international travel system, a weakness in one region constitutes a weakness for the entire 
system.  Ramzi Yousef and Ahmed Ressam are two al-Qaeda operatives who applied 
common terrorist tactics and techniques subvert international security measures. 
The 9/11 hijackers successfully entered the United States, obtained state driver’s 
licenses, and avoided detection by exploiting the limitations of numerous identity 
systems.  Since that time, the Department of Homeland Security has overseen multiple 
programs designed to prevent operatives from entering the United States or obtaining 
identity documents.  Many of these programs have not been completely implemented or 
are still susceptible to fraud.  This chapter will analyze examples of terrorist evasion and 
identity acquisition tactics, followed by an evaluation of efforts to counter these threats. 
                                                 
55 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, Thomas H. Kean, and Lee 
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B. THE INTERNATIONAL TRAVEL SYSTEM 
In 2010, the United Stated received nearly 60 million international travelers.56  
The overwhelming majority of these travelers came as tourists or to conduct business.  
The challenge for the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its constituent 
agencies is to distinguish known and potential terrorists from the legitimate travelers.   
International travel represents a significant sector of the American economy.  In 
additional to supporting 1.1 million domestic jobs, international tourists represent 7% of 
all U.S. exports.57  Actions taken to detect terrorists often slow international travel 
procedures, are cumbersome, and deter potential travelers.  But the risk to U.S. homeland 
security, as demonstrated by 9/11, requires an identification process that is user friendly 
and effective at detecting terrorists. 
Prior to traveling to the United States, foreign nationals must apply for a visa.  
Immigrant visas are issued to persons wishing to remain in the United States for an 
extended period of time.  Nonimmigrant visas are for visitors planning a temporary stay.  
Foreigners traveling from one of the 36 countries participating in the Visa Waiver 
Program are not required to apply for a visa unless planning to stay in the United States 
for more than 90 days.58 
Visa applications and passports are submitted for review at U.S. consulates 
overseas.  The Department of State processes visa requests and determines eligibility to 
travel to the United States.  If approved, the applicant may proceed to a U.S. port of 
entry.  Immigration officers then review all applicable identity documents and grant final 
authorization to enter the United States.59   
                                                 
56 Office of Travel and Tourism Industries, “International Visitation to the United States: A Statistical 
Summary of U.S. Visitation,” U.S. Department of Commerce (2010), 
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57 Ibid. 
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The Arrival/Departure Record, known as a Form I-94, is a system used to track 
visa overstays.  This paper based system has two components.  The arrival section 
requires travelers to provide basic information to include name, date of birth, nationality, 
sex, passport number, flight itinerary, and an address where they can be located while in 
the United States.60  When the visit is complete and the traveler exits the country, the 
transportation carrier is required to complete and submit the departure section of the I-94 
to DHS.61 
In order to more efficiently track visa overstays and reinforce border security, 
Congress required the former Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to 
“implement an automated entry and exit data system that would track the arrival and 
departure of every alien.”62  This requirement was included in the Illegal Immigration 
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996.  Subsequent modifications to the 
requirements of the system delayed its implementation.63   
Following the attacks of 9/11, the entry/exit program became the foundations of 
the U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (U.S.-VISIT) program.  
U.S.-VISIT was required by National Security Presidential Directive 59 (NSPD-
59)/Homeland Security Presidential Directive 24 (HSPD-24) to “coordinate the sharing 
of biometric and associated biographic and contextual information with other Federal 
agencies and foreign partners.”64  Since December 2006, biometric functionality has been 
used at 300 ports of entry.65 
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U.S.-VISIT provides significant advantages over previous authentication 
methods.  Foreign visitors are required to submit two fingerprints and a digital 
photograph upon entry into the United States.  This information is checked against and 
entered into a database known as the Automated Biometric Identification System 
(IDENT).  As of 2010, IDENT contained 108 million records.66  These records are also 
checked against the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) Integrated Automated 
Fingerprint System (IAFIS) that contains 50 million additional records.67 U.S.-VISIT’s 
vast database is used by four agencies within DHS as well as the Department of Defense 
(DoD), Department of Justice (DoJ), and Department of State (DoS).68  “As of June 2009 
… more than 150,000 biometric hits in entry [resulted] in more than 8,000 people having 
adverse actions, such as denial of entry, taken against them.”69 
While the biometric data contained within IDENT helps identify known terrorists 
and visa overstays, U.S.-VISIT has a very significant flaw.  DHS has been unable to 
comprehensively implement biometric exit capability.70  Without this capability, U.S.-
VISIT cannot determine if persons who entered the country have exited.  “Cost overruns, 
schedule delays, and performance problems”71 were cited as the primary factors behind 
this delay. 
Exit capability is not the only weakness of U.S.-VISIT.  U.S.-VISIT is an identity 
management network that is dependent upon secure token identifiers such as passports 
and driver’s licenses.  The 9/11 Staff Report stated that “Terrorists rely on forged 
                                                 
66 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Biometric Standards Requirements for U.S.-VISIT,” 
(2010): 1. 
67 Ibid.  
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passports and fake visas to move around the world unimpeded and undetected.”72  Ramzi 
Yousef, Ahmed Ressam, and the 9/11 hijackers are probative case studies that 
demonstrate common terrorist fraud tactics.  These tactics are still relevant in the pursuit 
of secure identity management systems today. 
C. TERRORIST TRAVEL TACTICS  
Ramzi Yousef, a co-conspirator in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, was 
apprehended with an accomplice in 1992 while attempting to enter the United States with 
fraudulent documents.  He flew in first class from Pakistan because he believed he would 
receive less stringent security screenings once in the United States.  In addition to 
numerous documents to support his false identity, Yousef was found with other passports, 
forgery instructions, and stamps used to alter passports.  He was released in the United 
States after he claimed political asylum and later escaped to Pakistan. Although Yousef 
was eventually captured, he was able to evade law enforcement for years by using altered 
and fake identity documents.73  
In 1994, Ahmed Ressam used a fraudulent passport to travel to Canada and was 
admitted after he claimed political asylum.  His asylum claim was denied after he failed 
to appear in court and a warrant was issued for his arrest.  Despite many misdemeanor 
arrests, Ressam was released and remained at large.  He used a fraudulent baptismal 
certificate to receive a genuine Canadian passport under an alias and traveled to 
Afghanistan to receive terrorist training.  Upon returning to Canada in 1999, Ressam 
devised plans to detonate a bomb at Los Angeles International Airport soon after the 
millennium.  When Ressam was trying to cross the border, U.S. Customs officials were 
alerted by his nervous demeanor and discovered explosives in his rental vehicle.74 
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Passports are essential token identifiers within the international travel system.  
They are designed to confirm nationality, identity, and immigration status.  
Consequently, passport forgery and alteration techniques are a necessary terrorist 
function.   
The international travel system depends on accurate screening of travelers at the 
point of origin.  Yousef subverted this measure by bribing a Pakistani official. 75  Once 
he was admitted into the system, he had an Iraqi passport to support his cover story.  
Secondary screening revealed Yousef had no visa and his passport was fraudulent.  He 
was arrested but released into the United States after he claimed political asylum.76   
Passport forgery has been used by criminal and terrorist elements to support 
operations.77  Forgery is used to generate funding and create documents as needed.  
Archaic entry and exit stamps are still being used to track travel history.  Terrorist cells 
can forge or manipulate these stamps to “conceal their terrorist activities.”78  The 9/11 
and Terrorist Travel staff report cited “removing visas and bleaching stamps”79 as a 
common alteration used by al Qaeda operatives. 
Rather than forging a passport, Ressam used fraudulent breeder documents to 
obtain a genuine Canadian passport.  This tactic represents the most favorable for terrorist 
operatives.  Genuine passports stand up to scrutiny and support an intended narrative.  
Had Ressam been able to control his nerves, U.S. customs officers would have had no 
obvious reason to refuse him entry into the country. 
The 9/11 hijackers successfully navigated gaps in immigration processing to enter 
the U.S. and remain undetected.  The 9/11 and Terrorist Travel staff report documents 
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multiple instances of identity verification failure prior to the terrorist attack. As many as 
seven hijackers submitted manipulated passports with their visa applications to enter the 
United States.80  Consular officials failed to recognize the alterations.  Three hijackers 
“had passports that contained an indicator of Islamist extremism” and two “made false 
statements about prior visa and travel history on their visa applications.”81  Significant 
failures existed at various stages of the immigration identification process. 
State Department and immigration officials had little training on document fraud, 
counterterrorism, or existing databases and missed all indicators of nefarious intent.82  In 
cases where databases were queried, the hijackers provided alternate spellings of their 
names.  This tactic was used over 360 times to avoid detection.83   
Two hijackers, including Mohammad Atta, remained in the United States despite 
expired visas.84  No exit system was in place and therefore no method for authorities to 
determine if the hijackers were still in the United States.85  Even if these hijackers had 
been identified as visa overstays, there was no link with law enforcement databases to 
flag the infraction.86  A flagging mechanism would have expanded the network of 
officials who might come in contact with the hijackers and increased the chances of 
capture.  
The United States does not have a national identification system.  Instead, state 
driver’s licenses and ID cards are commonly used to verify identification.87  
Understanding the importance of this, all but one of the 9/11 hijackers received state 
                                                 
80 Eldridge et al., 9/11 and Terrorist Travel: Staff Report of the National Commission on Terrorist 
Attacks Upon the United States, 138. 
81 Ibid., 139. 
82 Ibid., 137. 
83 Ibid., 4. 
84 Ibid., preface, x. 
85 Ibid., 7. 
86 Ibid. 
87 Gordon et al., “Identity Fraud: A Critical National and Global Threat,” 18. 
 22 
identification cards.88  Six hijackers used their ID cards “to check in for their flights on 
September 11.”89  Three of the ID cards used were obtained fraudulently.90  State 
identity issuing standards were much too low given the many significant uses of an 
identity card in the United States. 
These three examples demonstrate many of the common tactics used by terrorists 
to subvert identity procedures within the immigration and international travel systems.  
Passports could also have been stolen, borrowed, rented or purchased.91  After gaining 
access to the United States, these terrorists evaded capture by requesting political asylum, 
overstaying visas, and manipulating travel documents to conceal international travel.92  
The consistent modus operandi demonstrated that “terrorist operatives employed certain 
repetitive travel practices that were ripe for disruption.”93 
The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) first outlined these types of tactics in an 
annual document known as the “Redbook.”94 This information was not widely 
disseminated even though a serious threat to homeland security was clearly recognized.  
The Redbook was last published in 1992 and research on terrorist travel tactics waned 
until after the attacks on 9/11.95 
Many procedures and systems have been updated to narrow many of these gaps in 
homeland security, but significant gaps still exist. More robust training, procedures, 
systems and tamper-resistant documents are needed.  International travel, identity, and 
immigration systems require seamless integration to thwart another 9/11-style attack.  A 
recent example demonstrates this need. 
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The Government Accountability Office (GAO) conducted an undercover 
investigation from July to December 2008 to determine if counterfeit or fraudulent 
documents could be used to obtain a genuine U.S. passport.96  In four separate instances, 
an investigator presented various combinations of fraudulent driver’s licenses, birth 
certificates, and Social Security Numbers (SSN) with a passport application to employees 
of the Department of State (DoS) and U.S. Postal Service (USPS).97  In every instance, 
he was issued a genuine U.S. passport.98 
First-time passport applications are required to be completed in person at USPS or 
DoS offices.  The applicant’s identity is checked against two forms of photo ID and 
copies of all documents are sent to DoS for verification.  If all documentation is correct 
and the applicant is eligible, DoS issues a passport. 
The GAO investigator used fraudulent documents of an unspecified quality to test 
the application process (Figure 3).  At one office, he presented a counterfeit driver’s 
license, a counterfeit birth certificate, and a SSN for a 5-year-old child.99  The USPS 
accepted his counterfeit documents and DoS failed to catch the age discrepancy even 
though the application recorded his true age of 53.100  At another office, the investigator 
used the SSN of a person who died in 1965.101  USPS accepted the counterfeit identity 
documents and DoS again failed to properly verify the SSN.  The investigator used one of 
his fraudulently obtained passports to “get a boarding pass, and pass through the security 
checkpoint at a major metropolitan-area airport.”102 
When the results of the investigation were released, DoS “agreed that [GAO’s] findings 
expose a major vulnerability in State’s passport issuance process.”103  DoS complained 
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that it “does not have the ability to conduct real-time verification of the authenticity of 
birth certificates” and that they “had difficulties with verifying the authenticity of driver’s 
licenses.”104  USPS did not issue a response.105 
Figure 2.   Documents Used to Obtain Genuine U.S. Passports106 
D. CURRENT POLICIES AND THE WAY AHEAD 
Following the attacks on 9/11, significant reforms began to change the security 
landscape.  Automated exit/entry systems, machine-readable travel documents, electronic 
passenger manifests, biometric requirements, and standardized technology sharing 
standards promised to secure Americas borders from transnational terrorism.  In 2002, the 
Department of Homeland Security was formed to oversee the numerous government 
agencies responsible for implementing and utilizing these systems.  
U.S.-VISIT was intended to automate the entry and exit process for foreign 
travelers.  Biometric fingerprint scanners and passport scanners allow identity 
                                                 
104 Ibid., 9. 
105 Ibid., 10. 
106 Ibid., 5. 
 25 
information to be stored and checked against the IDENT and IAFIS databases.  This 
allows known terrorists be identified at ports of entry.  However, the lack of an exit 
component significantly degrades system utility.107  Immigration officials do not have 
access to a resource that can quickly identify visa overstays.108  Since no biometric data 
is taken the time of departure, exit records cannot be accurately checked against entry 
records.109   
Although biometric data is a necessary component of the international travel 
system, it is not infallible.  A terrorist may acquire a genuine passport using a fraudulent 
driver’s license, birth certificate, social security card, or other breeder documentation.  If 
that terrorist has not been previously biometrically scanned, he may be granted access to 
the United States.  A biometric record would be created, but no alerts would be raised by 
his alias. 
The Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) Secure Flight Program 
requires airline passengers to provide name, date of birth, and gender when purchasing 
tickets.  The airline submits passenger manifests to the TSA to be screened against the No 
Fly and Selectee lists.  Boarding passes are issued if the name is not on any 
corresponding watch list.  Passenger identity is then verified using a government issued 
ID at the airport as part of the security screening process.110  However, most domestic 
identity documents are not electronically verified.  Fraudulent, stolen, or altered IDs are 
easily obtained and could help a terrorist pass screening. 
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A recent Government Accountability Office (GAO) report examined the current 
state of U.S efforts to thwart terrorist travel and warned that some foreign partners pose a 
significant risk in four key areas.  First, information is not being effectively with partners 
due to a lack of a comprehensive terrorist screening database, unwillingness or inability 
to share information between countries, and/or failure to use biometric or biographical 
data in the screening process.111  Information sharing requires funding and resources not 
readily available to many countries.  But technology standards are being developed to 
facilitate biometric sharing in the future.112 
Second, fraudulent documents (passports, visas, birth certificates, ect…) are 
inexpensive and widely available.113  Many are indiscernible if not checked against 
existing databases.  Surveys showed that 73% of asylum officers found “it was 
moderately or very difficult to identify document fraud.”114  Scarce resources limit 
access to crosschecking systems.  Identity management is further complicated when 
countries fail to report lost or stolen passports, allowing valid documents to be used 
fraudulently.115 
Third, the passports of some countries do not have sufficient security features to 
prevent reproduction or manipulation.  Saudi passports, for example, lack serial numbers 
that could be watch listed to detect fraud.116 Even when updated passports are issued, 
previous versions are valid for up to ten years after issuance.117 
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Finally, the customs personnel of many countries are subject to bribes and 
corruption.  In such countries, valid passports with fake identities can be purchased 
relatively inexpensively.  These documents are then added to international databases and 
are accepted as valid elsewhere.118 
Many U.S. agencies are investing in programs to strengthen the capabilities of 
foreign partners but “the international travel system is only as secure as its weakest 
link.”119  The current system still has significant flaws as exemplified by the case of 
Olajide Oluwaseun Noib. 
In the summer of 2011, Olajide Oluwaseun Noib successfully boarded a flight to 
New York from Los Angeles using an expired boarding pass and a student identification 
card.  At the security checkpoint, the 24-year-old with dual U.S.-Nigerian citizenship 
presented his student ID and a police report to support his story that his passport was 
stolen.  Neither the security screener nor security supervisor noticed his expired boarding 
pass with another person’s name and allowed him to pass. Noib was not identified until 
his flight was underway and airline personnel realized he was sitting in a seat that was 
supposed to be vacant.  He was eventually released and ordered to pay restitution after 
spending five months in jail awaiting trial.120 
Fortunately for the passengers on his flight, Noib was not a terrorist.  He was an 
innovative transient who discovered a convenient way of subverting TSA’s security 
measures.121  If a homeless man with no money can easily overcome current security 
measures, what could a terrorist with training and financial backing accomplish? 
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E. CONCLUSION 
The 9/11 Commission Report created a list of recommendations intended to 
strengthen U.S. identity verification systems in response to the inadequacy of existing 
systems.  At the top of this list was the inclusion of biometric data in databases at U.S. 
ports of entry.122  While this additional layer of security is important and necessary, it 
does not make identity verification foolproof.  Databases are only as good as the 
information they contain.  Biometric data can help vet out aliases and simple evasion 
tactics such as alternate name spellings. However, biometric data cannot prevent 
terrorists from acquiring fake source documents with someone else’s information to 
obtain genuine passports. 
The GAO correctly surmised that “the international travel system is only as secure 
as its weakest link.”123  While U.S. identification and security systems are maturing, they 
require additional development to reach intended potential.  Some foreign partners 
continue to allow dangerous lapses in security measures that undermine the entire system.  
Antiquated paper documents and a general lack of information sharing contribute to these 
lapses.  Even when proper document security measures are in place, corrupt customs 
officials are available to subvert the vetting process.  Strengthening U.S and foreign 
partner capabilities is vital to restrain terrorist travel and protect the integrity of the 
international travel system. 
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III. CRIMINAL ORGANIZATIONS AND IDENTITY 
MANAGEMENT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Identity management is critical to criminal and terrorist organizations.  However, 
the threat of organized crime plays a much broader and more pervasive role in the 
undermining of identity verification systems.  Stolen identity information may be used to 
establish fraudulent lines of credit, create fraudulent documents, or sold to other criminals 
for profit.  Each of these actions creates fractures in identity verification systems that 
increase fragility and decrease reliability.  
Criminal organizations have taken advantage of technology to become more 
decentralized and anonymous.  Both criminal and terrorist organizations “operate on 
network structures that at times intersect, such as using smuggling and other illicit means 
to raise cash and then employ similar fraud schemes to move their funds.”124  Similar 
goals and structures between criminals and terrorists allow strategies to permeate 
between each set of organizations.125 
Network analysis tools have traditionally been applied to sectors of critical 
infrastructure. Contemporary criminal organizations, similar to terrorist groups, operate 
on networked constructs.  This chapter will explore the structure of contemporary 
criminal organizations, explore the utility of network analysis, and examine links with 
terrorism.  Additionally, this chapter will discuss the ways criminal organizations exploit 
weaknesses in identity verification systems while focusing on the risks to U.S. homeland 
security. 
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Figure 3.   Uses of Fictitious or Stolen Identity126  
B. CONTEMPORARY ORGANIZED CRIME 
1. Structure 
Many contemporary organized criminal enterprises adhere to a network structure 
rather than territorial or regional based organization.  Networked organizations “are 
major beneficiaries of globalization…[that] take advantage of increased travel, trade, 
rapid money movements, telecommunications and computer links, and are well 
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positioned for growth.”127  They are “exceptionally nimble…adapt quickly to changing 
political and economic realities…[and are] pragmatic and willing to forge new 
alliances.”128  Networked structures facilitate adaptability unlike hierarchical structures 
that depend on leadership and rigid, defined structure to function.   Communications 
technologies allow decentralized nodes to collaborate across borders, often anonymously.  
Networking promotes collusion while protecting the identity of each respective node of 
the organization.   
Decentralization across borders exponentially complicates law enforcement 
efforts to curtail crime.  Jurisdictional boundaries and limits on resources restrict 
investigational reach.  This limitation allows criminal organizations to diversify, expand, 
or downsize as needed with little exposure.  Localized efforts to disrupt criminal 
operations are often ineffectual since other actors are readily available to fill any voids in 
the system.  In this sense, it takes a network to defeat a network.129   
Identity management is a vital function of organized crime used to camouflage 
criminal activity.  Concealing identity protects nodes of criminal organizations from 
arrest or retaliation by rival organizations.  Anonymity insulates the network in case any 
node is compromised and compelled to divulge information.  That node’s knowledge of 
the network is limited to a particular sector. 
Identity crimes have been used by criminal organizations as a lucrative 
enterprise.130  While these networks typically diversify into other criminal activities, 
identity crimes are attractive because they offer a low risk of detection while providing a 
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high rate of return.131  The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) reports that stolen identity 
information is most often used to commit credit card fraud, establish utilities, counterfeit 
financial documents, file for bankruptcy, make large purchases, gain employment or 
obtain identity documents.132  Each of these tactics allow actors to sustain their criminal 
activity while simultaneously carrying out the responsibilities of their respective nodes of 
the network. 
2. Network Analysis and Transnational Organized Crime 
Transnational organized crime presents numerous challenges to governments and 
law enforcement. Jurisdictions and the lack of international cooperation greatly 
contribute to the success and sustainment of these organizations.  Attempts to dismantle 
organized crime are largely ineffective without comprehensive examination of the entire 
organization.   Network analysis is essential to obtain a larger perspective and identify 
critical nodes of network structure and operation.   
Ted G. Lewis, a pioneer in the field of critical infrastructure, defines a network as 
“a collection of nodes and links that connect pairs of nodes.”133  A basic network could 
consist of two people talking.  Each person represents a node that is linked by two-way 
voice communication.  This network can be pictorially represented by two dots connected 
by a line.  If the example is expanded to include ten persons having random conversations 
in a room, the pictorial representation becomes more complex.  Inferences can be made 
about the relationships between each person by observing the number of interactions, the 
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analysis focuses “on structural metrics rather than analysis of the characteristics of certain 
individual members of a group.”134  Combining this data with intelligence helps build a 
more concrete model for investigation. 
Nodes and links are not restricted to persons or communications.  They can 
represent “abstract concepts.”135  In the example of organized crime, a node could 
represent a decision maker, a critical function of operations, or location central to the 
organization.  When basic organizational nodes are mapped, vulnerabilities can be 
identified and targeted. 
In the field of infrastructure protection, vulnerability analysis is used to identify 
network weaknesses and examine the potential for failure given a particular attack.  The 
process requires the identification of critical nodes, describing the relationship between 
critical nodes, and determining which nodes are essential to the sustainment of the 
network.136 This process can be applied to models of transnational criminal 
organizations.  Critical nodes of these networks can then be effectively targeted, 
dismantled, or fragmented according to policy objectives. 
Identity crimes require a network.137  The infrastructure of an identity theft/fraud 
network can be divided into three primary roles.   Continuing with the critical 
infrastructure analogy, these roles will be referred to as generators, transmitters/ 
distributors, and end users.138  Persons responsible for stealing information or blank valid 
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information by retrieving it from the trash, mail theft, hacking of business records, 
abusing access to business databases, fraudulent credit card scanners, stealing purses or 
wallets, or phone and Internet scams.139 
Once raw information or documents are acquired, generators pass it to 
transmitters or distributors.  Transmitters are associated with larger networks and move 
large volumes of information to distributors.  In smaller networks, transmitters and 
distributors can be the same actor.  Distributors take identity information and convert it to 
a useable product for dissemination.  This may be done by creating fraudulent documents 
or by soliciting known consumers. 
Finally, the end user takes custody of the fraudulent documents or stolen 
information to use as needed.  The end user provides the demand for identity products 
and sustains the criminal network. While this description of generators, 
transmitters/distributors, and end users is very simplistic, the particular nuances of each 
criminal network vary greatly.  Relationships between nodes can be shaped by 
geographic location, level of trust, ability to communicate, and access to information. 
Additional actors can be subcontracted or fired in response to needs of the network.  
Ultimately, criminal networks grow, adapt, and respond to demand from the end user. 
Network and vulnerability analysis provides investigators with a valuable 
resource.  It creates a map of targeted organizations and identifies critical nodes of 
network operations.  Resources can then be efficiently concentrated to accomplish policy 
objectives.  Without network and vulnerability analysis, countering organized crime 
ineffectively disperses investigators across an impossibly wide front. 
Hackers are persons who use knowledge and capability to hijack a system for a 
purpose other than it was originally intended.  While this behavior is typically associated 
with computer networks, the concept is easily transferred to other networks as well.  For 
instance, identity verification networks are hacked when persons misrepresent themselves 
as someone else. They gain access to goods and services that they would not have 
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otherwise been entitled to.  The following examples demonstrate some of the ways that 
identity systems can be hacked by criminal organizations.  
3. The Criminal Element in Action 
Network security is often maintained by “layering” identity crimes to complicate 
law enforcement efforts.140 Judith Collins describes the creation and layering of a 
criminal network in her book Investigating Identity Theft: A Guide for businesses, Law 
Enforcement, and Victims. 
A woman, who was hired by a temporary staffing agency, printed a list of 
personal information for over 3,000 employees on her last day of employment.141  The 
list included “names, home, and work addresses, Social Security numbers, payroll and 
other personal identifying information.”142  She later sold and distributed the information 
to friends and family who continued using and selling it to others.  Investigators 
eventually discovered five collaborating cells that committed a wide range of frauds for 
financial gain.143 
This five-cell network remained relatively centralized and consisted of 45 
individuals.144  Members of some cells had social connections with other cells and 
network communication was strong.  The close proximity of the primary actors allowed 
investigators to sift through the multiple layers of identity frauds with relative ease.  The 
level of network complexity rises exponentially when nodes are separated by 
international borders, are not socially acquainted, or covered by additional layers of 
identity fraud as the case of Khurram Iftikhar demonstrates. 
The United States Postal Inspectors were alerted by the Monterey County 
Sherriff’s Office in 1999 that a shipment of computer components had been ordered with 
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a stolen credit card number and was en route to a local parcel shipping service.145  U.S. 
Postal Inspectors investigated the report and discovered many similar purchases, all sent 
to various branches of the shipping service within the United States.  The purchaser had 
provided a copy of a fraudulent photo ID and forwarding addresses to overseas shipping 
companies.146 
The investigation progressed slowly since U.S. investigative services could not 
compel foreign companies to provide additional evidence.  Interviews of the victims, 
whose credit card information was stolen, revealed that all had attempted to purchase 
computer products from Internet auction sites.147  The sites were being used to seal credit 
card information that would then be used to purchase computer products to be shipped to 
an unknown perpetrator.148 
After three years of investigations by multiple U.S. and foreign law enforcement 
agencies, the fraudulently obtained shipments were eventually traced to a business in 
Pakistan.  Khurram Iftikhar created an elaborate fraud scheme after his legitimate 
business had failed.149  After obtaining credit card numbers, Iftikhar made several small 
purchases of computer products that were sent to the U.S. shipping service and then 
forwarded to overseas shipping companies.  After the many smaller shipments were 
consolidated into larger shipments outside the United States, Iftikhar would provide 
shipping instructions to his company in Pakistan.150 
Iftikhar successfully layered his criminal activity to evade detection by exploiting 
weaknesses in international cooperation and by using fraudulent identification.  His 
largest failure was in streamlining the fraud process. By acting as the generator, 
distributor and end user, Iftikhar guaranteed that the detection of any one facet of his 
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operation would lead to the discovery of the entire network.  Had these roles been 
diversified among multiple nodes, a compromised node could have been quickly replaced 
without degrading the efficiency of the network. 
Organized crime, as it has been described above, is both an economic and 
homeland security threat.  These fraud schemes took advantage of lapses in the security 
of identity management systems and international borders for personal financial gain.  
However, the process is replicated by untold numbers of similar organizations and 
individuals.  The mass proliferation of stolen identity and fraudulent documents 
undermines the reliability of identity systems.  Crime and terror organizations exploit 
these fractures to further their respective agendas.  
C. THE “CRIME-TERROR NEXUS”151 
Recent research suggests that criminal and terrorist organizations “have begun to 
reveal many operational and organizational similarities.”152 This is particularly 
concerning in the realm of identity verification and management.  Identity manipulation 
is vital to the success of both organizations.  “Identity fraud is a national and global threat 
to the security of nations and their citizens, the economy, and global commerce, as it 
facilitates a wide range of crimes and terrorism.”153 
The organizational line between crime and terror is becoming less well 
defined.154  A decline in state-sponsorship of terror means that terrorists must turn 
elsewhere for funding.155  Organized criminal activity offers a proven framework to help 
financially support terrorist networks.  The network structure is ideal for smuggling 
operations, corruption, and extortion schemes traditionally seen within criminal 
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organizations.156  Document fraud, in particular, provides a source of funding while 
simultaneously fulfilling a vital logistical need.157  Figure 2 shows how stolen 
information flows through a criminal and/or terrorist network to be converted into capital 
or used as a logistical tool for operations. 
Interactions between crime-terror nexus are evident but are not always clear.158  
Recent research on the subject provides insight as to the ways these two organizations 
share strategies.  Established criminal organizations are primarily profit driven and are 
unlikely to turn entirely to terrorism since governments focus efforts against high profile, 
violent groups.159     
Perri and Brody describe the crime-terror nexus as a crosspollination of tactics 
between criminal and terrorist groups designed to forward each other’s respective 
agendas.160  Terrorists may use criminal resources or tactics to support operations while 
criminals use terrorist methods to alter the political landscape.  For example, Hassan 
Moussa Makki smuggled cigarettes from Indian reservations to buyers in Detroit, 
Michigan.161  He trafficked “between $36,000 and $72,000 of contraband cigarettes per 
month between 1997 and 1999…[and] would then remit the proceeds from these illegal 
tobacco sales to Hezbollah.”162  Conversely, drug cartels have used targeted violence 
against Mexican authorities to terrorize and force officials to ignore illicit activity.163  
The sharing of tactics benefits both organizations while allowing each to focus on their 
core motivations. 
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D. CONCLUSION 
Identity management is a critical function of criminal and terrorist organizations.  
Weak identity systems allow criminal organizations to build networks dedicated to 
identity theft and fraudulent document production.  These actions provide a steady source 
of revenue and further undermine existing identity systems.  Comprehensive reforms are 
necessary to protect the nation from the threat to economic and homeland security.  
Critical infrastructure network and vulnerability analysis provides a promising 
framework for identifying and dismantling criminal organizations.  This process reduces 
“the cognitive and information overload”164 faced by investigators and policymakers.  An 
effective counterstrategy should involve “an integrated technological, organizational, and 
policy-based approach.”165  In any case, the “war on terrorism cannot be separated from 
the war against fraud.”166  Given the operational and organizational ties between crime 
and terror, a strategy to counter fraud should diminish the capacity and capability of both 
to function effectively. 
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IV. COMMON VULNERABILITIES OF IDENTITY SYSTEMS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The asymmetric threat of terrorism gave birth to the fields of homeland security 
and critical infrastructure protection.  Both are relevant studies that can contribute to the 
security of identity verification systems.  While many changes have been made to secure 
identity systems, terrorists still have access to quality identity information and 
documents.  Fraudulent documents are still capable of subverting security processes.  
Transnational terrorism poses a real threat to homeland security, but terrorists constitute a 
very small percentage of the population that utilizes the international travel system. 
Organized transnational crime exploits gaps in law enforcement capability and 
international cooperation.  Identity management is a vital function of these organizations 
and is widely used to support operations and generate funding.  The total effect of their 
efforts to undermine current identity systems is widely unknown since no single data 
source reports on the fraudulent use of identity.167  However, the scope of system 
fragility can be placed into perspective by canvassing other users of fraudulent 
documents. 
In this chapter, common sources of identity system fragility will be examined.  
The widespread dissemination and use of fraudulent identity documents exponentially 
complicates efforts to target terrorists and other persons who pose a threat to homeland 
security.  Underage drinkers, illegal immigrants, and other criminal actors are common 
supporters and users of the fraudulent document industry.  Strategies to counter terrorist 
travel and secure identity systems must take these actors into account.  The cumulative 
impact of these actors in not known. 
                                                 
167 G. R. Gordon, N. A. Willox, D. J. Rebovich, T. M. Regan, and J. B. Gordon, “Identity Fraud: A 
Critical National and Global Threat,” Journal of Economic Crime Management 2, (2004): 7. 
 42 
B. COMMON SOURCES OF IDENTITY FRAGILITY 
1. Underage Drinkers 
In the first six months of 2011, investigators in the Chicago area seized over 1700 
fake driver’s licenses bound for teenagers seeking access to purchase alcohol.168  
Websites traced to China took personal information and payment online, and then 
shipped fraudulent driver’s licenses that are “indistinguishable” from their authentic 
counterparts.169  The shipments arrived hidden inside inconspicuous goods at a cost of no 
more than $100.170 
Users of the service face criminal charges and potential identity theft 
victimization.  The websites require users to provide a name, photo and signature.171  
Addresses are taken from real estate websites.172  Service providers obviously have the 
capability to create quality fraudulent licenses.  Users who submit their real names 
unwittingly give the service providers a valid identity that can be sold.  A consumer 
advocacy group warns that personal data will often “end up on a network of illegal 
trading sites where hackers and criminals from around the world will openly buy and sell 
large amounts of personal data for profit.”173   
The United States has no federal identification card and “a driver’s license is used 
as the primary verification tool for establishing age and residency, and is the 
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quintessential photo identification.”174  Fraudulent driver’s licenses identify, 
authenticate, and authorize imposters to access services they might not otherwise have.  
Prior to 9/11, a U.S. driver’s license was the only required documentation needed to enter 
or exit the United States by land into Mexico or Canada.175  Procedures have been 
updated to require a passport, but a fraudulent driver’s license could be used in a passport 
application. 
This online scheme offers a simple and inexpensive means to acquire a high-
quality breeder document without risking exposure at a legitimate license issuing office.  
Criminal and terrorist organizations can now outsource this skill rather than maintaining 
internal capability.  The identity service provider could be a vital node within criminal 
and terrorist networks. 
2. Illegal Immigration 
As of March 2010, the estimated illegal alien population in the United States 
totaled 11.2 million persons.176  Specific numbers are not available; however, “it is 
reasonable to presume that many of these unauthorized aliens are committing document 
fraud.”177  Employment opportunity draws illegal immigrants into the United States and 
document fraud offers them the capability to remain undetected.  Although federal law 
prohibits employers from hiring illegal aliens, the employment verification process is 
fraught with document and identity fraud.178  While the illegal immigrant population is 
largely innocuous, the industry they support actively undermines essential identity 
verification systems.  A recent example demonstrates the threat.  
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A 44-year-old Pakistani immigrant, Shamsha Laiwalla, established a California 
business that claimed to handle interactions with the Department of Motor Vehicles 
(DMV) for paying customers.  In addition to her advertized services, she was able to 
procure valid driver’s licenses and breeder documents from California, Nevada, and 
Washington.  An undercover detective, posing as an illegal alien, negotiated with 
Laiwalla to receive a valid driver’s license, “expertly forged” birth certificate and Social 
Security card with a fraudulent identity in exchange for $3,500.179 
Laiwalla was part of an extensive network, including DMV employees, which 
could create valid identification documents and manipulate state records.  A joint 
FBI/LAPD counterterrorism investigation resulted in charges against Laiwalla and 13 
accomplices.180   
This network successfully thwarted all identity issuing security measures by 
corrupting the license issuing procedure.  Once a valid license and breeder documents are 
obtained, the user has unlimited access to the rights and privileges given to U.S. citizens.  
Genuine documents that are fraudulently obtained are nearly impossible to trace.  
Visa overstays are a part of the immigration process that requires immediate 
reforms.  Immigrants or visitors lawfully enter the United States and then fail to leave 
when their visas expire.  Estimates place current the number of current visa overstays at 
4 million to 5.5 million persons.181  U.S.-VISIT creates a biometric and biographic 
record for visitors entering the United States, but cannot detect whether visitors leave 
when expected because no biometric exit data is collected.182  As a result, entrance and 
exit data cannot be compared.  The 9/11and Terrorist Travel staff report identified visa  
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overstays as a common terrorist tactic.183  If a terrorist were identified after entering into 
the United States, no mechanism could reliably determine if he or she remained in the 
country. 
Immigrants who enter the United States and overstay their visas must seek 
employment.  Although federal law prohibits employers from hiring illegal aliens, the 
employment verification process is fraught with document and identity fraud.184  The 
E-Verify system offers employers an electronic alternative to paper-based employment 
verification systems, but a research firm found in 2009 that over 50% of those who were 
ineligible for employment were found eligible.185 The U.S. government cannot 
effectively restrict illegal immigrants from gaining employment because document fraud 
has significantly undermined its authentication system.  
In a 2011 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report, 73% of officers 
assigned to determine identity for asylum claims reported “it was moderately or very 
difficult to identify document fraud.”186  This is not surprising, given the availability and 
relatively low cost of quality identity documents.  Incomplete mechanisms for immigrant 
processing and ineffective immigration enforcement contribute to the undocumented 
immigrant population.  While most are in the United States seeking opportunity, the large 
undocumented population exponentially complicates efforts to detect terrorists and 
criminals.   
3. Cybercrime 
The Internet offers an infrastructure for information sharing that is unparalleled in 
human history.  Users are partially protected by its perceived anonymity and large scale 
use.  However, resourceful cybercriminals have developed tools to target user’s private 
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information.  Nefarious programs collectively known as “spyware” are capable of 
covertly breaching computer security mechanisms, controlling system resources, and/or 
collecting and distributing personal information.187   
Hacking allows skilled persons to access personal information from networked 
systems.  Business databases are particularly vulnerable to hacking.188  In April 2011, 
77 million records for a popular gaming console’s were hacked.189  The full extent of the 
hack could not be determined, however, it was believed that names, addresses, birth 
dates, e-mail addresses, logins, passwords, and credit card information was 
compromised.190  Information of this quality could easily be marketed and sold online.  
Most companies maintain electronic records and customers are likely to have personal 
information on file with many different businesses.  Customers are completely powerless 
to prevent this type of theft. 
The Internet, in addition to providing an endless source of identity information, 
can be used in support of other criminal operations.  Online credit card schemes offer a 
source of income and can garnish identity information.191  Unrestricted international 
communication supports smuggling operations and movements of money.192  
Transnational terrorists, in particular, have found this capability useful.  In 2007, 
FBI Director Robert Muller testified to Congress that “terrorists increasingly use the 
Internet to communicate, conduct operational planning, proselytize, recruit, train and to  
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obtain logistical and financial support.”193 Activist hackers, commonly known as 
“hacktivists,” have reportedly provided financial aid to al Qaeda with identity theft and 
credit card schemes.194  
Internet fraud schemes, identity theft from spyware, and hacking present uniquely 
challenging problems for U.S. policymakers.  Congress has found it difficult to clearly 
define the differences between spyware and software designed to enhance the user’s 
experience.195  Transnational borders complicate efforts to bring offenders to justice.  
Consequently, Congress has been unable to create meaningful legislation to restrict the 
use of spyware.196  Instead, most legislation has been aimed at strengthening information 
systems and notifying victims after their information has been stolen.197 
The Internet is a means of identity acquisition, distribution, and fraudulent use.  
Novices can use it to educate themselves on fraudulent document production or gain 
access to websites that will generate documents to order.198  Criminal organizations and 
terrorists increase their network reach beyond international borders in support of 
organizational goals.  Users demand additional functionality which exposes them to cyber 
attack, but governments can do little to protect them.   
4. Common and Organized Crime 
Common criminals, in addition to cybercriminals, erode the foundations of 
current identity management systems.  They utilize stolen identity on a smaller scale than 
organized crime, but for many of the same reasons.  For example, a 2007 U.S. 
Department of Justice intelligence bulletin reported that methamphetamine users were 
increasingly using stolen personal checks to purchase items that could be sold or traded 
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for drugs.199  Stolen identity information was also used to launder large transfers of 
money and to make large purchases of cold medication used in the drug manufacturing 
process.200 
Criminal record identity theft is an effective tactic used to evade law enforcement.  
When arrested or cited, an imposter misrepresents himself to law enforcement using 
stolen identity information.201  The imposter is then released without repercussion.  This 
tactic also prevents law enforcement from determining if the person they have detained 
has a prior record or outstanding warrant.202  Criminal record identity theft complicates 
law enforcement efforts, allows criminals to walk free, and passes the burden of clearing 
cases of mistaken identity to victims.203 
Organized crime takes advantage of networks to bring diverse resources together.  
Shamsha Laiwalla used her access to clients and connections with corrupt motor vehicles 
officials to fulfill demand for fraudulent identity documents.  Had this network been 
strategically located across international borders, Laiwalla’s arrest would have had a 
minimal impact.  Other actors could quickly fill the vacuum left by her arrest. 
Transnational criminal organizations adapt and change dynamically in response to 
environmental factors.  The network structure they use is a function of their adaptive 
nature.  Profit motive is their primary motivation.  Strengthening identity systems limits 
organizational ability to move people and money.   
5. Policy Decisions 
Policy decisions can have a profound effect on the overall security of identity 
management systems.  Political motivations, poor research data, and/or lobbies influence 
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policymakers to implement changes with consequences that are often beyond the 
intended effect.  For example, New Mexico’s driver’s license law was intended to create 
an immigrant-friendly environment but ended up seriously undermining the integrity of 
the system. 
In 2003, New Mexico changed state law to allow immigrants to acquire a driver’s 
license that is exactly the same as that of a U.S. citizen.204  Applicants are required to 
provide breeder documents to prove their identity, but cannot be asked about their 
immigration status. An investigation conducted by the Associated Press discovered 
serious indications of fraud.  Many of the licenses issued had business or fictitious 
addresses.  The investigation found 170 addresses that were listed to 10 or more persons.  
Some of these could be legitimately explained, but most were attributed to fraud.  New 
Mexico licensing authorities had no mechanism available to detect when multiple 
licenses were being issued to the same address. 
New Mexico’s governor, Susana Martinez, cited national security concerns in her 
attempt to change the law. She surmised that the licenses could “be used to board 
airplanes, conduct financial transactions, or get another license in some other state.”205  
The bill to rescind the law has yet to pass the state Senate and House.  
Federal authorities have sought to control state procedures for issuing identity 
documents through legislation.  The REAL ID Act of 2005 is intended to increase 
security standards and security procedures for the issuing of state driver’s licenses.  
Facilities must upgrade security infrastructure by incorporating cameras, alarms, 
electronic detection and limiting access to equipment and materials.206  Information 
technologies must be interoperable from state-to-state and include software to protect 
personal information from hackers.207  Licenses must be tamper-resistant and include 
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facial recognition capability.208  Business practices should be changed have licenses 
issued from a central processing center to limit employees from corrupting the system.209  
Finally, all breeder documentation provided with an application must be verified.210 
All 50 states were originally required to be in compliance with the new standards 
by May 11, 2011, but setbacks forced DHS to push the final compliance date back to 
January 13, 2013.211 Many states delayed implementation because of pending legislation, 
the PASS ID Act of 2009, which would have made these provisions optional.212 With the 
final implementation of REAL ID, the United States will have an identity system that is 
functionally equivalent to a national ID.  These measures should significantly increase 
the validity of genuine state-issued identity tokens.  However, the availability of quality 
fraudulent counterparts threatens to undermine other identity systems.  
C. CONCLUSION 
The examples above demonstrate some of the many ways that identity systems are 
undermined resulting in decreased utility.  U.S. homeland security depends on systems 
that can quickly and accurately verify identity persons at ports of entry and deep inside 
the nation.  Underage drinkers, illegal aliens, criminals, poor policy all contribute to 
weaknesses of the system.  The immeasurably large number of fraudulent documents 
exponentially complicates efforts to detect and apprehend terrorists.  Organized crime 
continues to manufacture documents to meet demand while making a profit and evading 
law enforcement.  These gaps in identity systems have significant detrimental effects on 
issues that are central to U.S. homeland security. 
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Current laws and regulations “tend to deal with the problem in a piecemeal 
fashion, rather than attacking the big picture.”213  The many complicated aspects of 
identity management have made comprehensive reform difficult, at best.  Weak identity 
systems have wide ranging effects that cannot be comprehensively understood without 
the analytical tools used in critical infrastructure. Chapter V will present 
recommendations for the way ahead using the critical infrastructure framework. 
                                                 
213 G. R. Gordon et al., “Identity Fraud: A Critical National and Global Threat,” 28. 
 52 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 53 
V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This thesis is focused on providing a thorough understanding of the vulnerabilities 
associated with weak identity systems and analyzing identity systems as a critical 
infrastructure.  Terrorist travel tactics were explained in order to show security gaps in 
the international travel system.  Organized crime was explored as a potential source of 
fraudulent documents and compared with terrorism using tools of network analysis. The 
effects of underage drinkers, illegal immigration, policy decisions, and cyber threats were 
described to illustrate the range of actors who are actively undermining identity systems.   
No single source can determine the net effect that these entities have in degrading 
identity system utility.  However, the critical infrastructure analogy provides a framework 
necessary to start identifying critical nodes and developing effective strategies to protect 
system integrity.  The structure, function, and widespread use of identity systems 
necessitate “unprecedented cooperation that is needed to develop, implement, and 
maintain a coordinated national effort to bring together government at all levels.”214 
This final chapter will explore the framework of critical infrastructure and draw 
comparisons with identity systems.  Basic principles of security will be discussed to 
further the analogy and outline recommendations for future policy.   
B. CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE FRAMEWORK 
Critical infrastructure was most recently defined in the USA PATRIOT Act of 
2001 as: 
Systems or assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States 
that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a 
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debilitating effect on security, national economic security, national public 
health or safety, or any combination of those matters.215 
The Department of Homeland Security currently recognizes 18 separate sectors of 
critical infrastructure.216  Under HSPD-7, the Secretary of DHS was directed to 
coordinate national efforts to identify, assess, and protect these key assets.  This task is 
infinitely complicated and well beyond the scope of any single bureaucracy.  Ted G. 
Lewis described the challenges of critical infrastructure protection as a “set of wicked 
problems.”217 
Critical infrastructure is large in terms of geographic size and quantity.  The 
electrical grid, for example, contains an incomprehensible number of miles of power 
lines.  Thousands of electric generating plants feed the system, monitor its load, and 
respond to electrical demand.  Neither the public nor private sectors have direct control of 
the grid, but regulatory agencies dictate the terms that allow the interconnected plants to 
operate safely.  In reality, the term “grid” is insufficient to describe the electrical system.  
Electricity is generated and distributed through a system of systems. 
The complexity of the electrical system and range of owner/operators makes 
comprehensive knowledge of intricate nuances of the system nearly impossible.218  
Analytical tools and models are developed to describe and predict system function.  This 
is particularly important when defending system components from attackers such as 
terrorists.  If the most vital components of the system can be identified, then assets can be 
allocated to protect them.   
Network analysis is an important tool used to determine vulnerability.219  It is 
used to map and describe the relationship between components, or nodes of a system.  A 
system that can continue to function when multiple critical nodes experience failure is 
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resilient.220  Conversely, a system that fails when few components are forced offline is 
brittle.221  A cascading failure occurs when a small event triggers a series of failures that 
“propagates throughout a major portion of the infrastructure, ending in calamity.”222  The 
process of model-based vulnerability analysis (MBVA) allows the system or selected 
system components to be tested.223  Once MBVA is conducted, strategies and procedures 
can be developed to increase system resiliency.   
Policymakers conduct risk analysis using MBVA. 224  Analyzing risk is a process 
of making decisions to allocate resources to protect critical nodes and maximize system 
utility.  Budgetary constraints limit the amount of resources available to harden critical 
nodes.225  System function, nature of the threat, and intended result will shape how these 
resources are spent.   Given that disruptions can be caused by nature or man, responses 
should be developed from an “all-hazards” approach.226  This approach mitigates system 
disruption by tailoring responses to meet the most-likely threats.  A chemical spill, for 
example, could be caused by an accidental train derailment or intentional terrorist act.  
Regardless of the cause, first-responders must have equipment and trained personnel 
available to counter the threat. 
Ted G. Lewis identified the seven major challenges to infrastructure protection as 
vastness, control, information sharing, interdependencies, system knowledge, inadequate 
analytical tools, and asymmetric conflict.227 Each of these challenges translates 
seamlessly to identity systems.   
Identity management is facilitated by vast a system of systems.  Interconnected 
databases, under public and private control, support a multitude of transactions.  
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Customers and service providers depend on identity systems to return immediate and 
accurate results when queried.  Roles, responsibilities, and system function are simplistic 
at a large scale.  However, complexity of the system and of these relationships rises 
exponentially as scale decreases.   
Decreasing the scale of identity systems brings this narrative to uncharted 
territory.  This thesis has argued that identity is a system and asset, physical and virtual, 
vital to the United States that would have a debilitating effect on national and economic 
security if incapacitated.  Acceptance of this description would necessitate observing 
identity management systems as a stand-alone sector of critical infrastructure.   
Current analytical tools of identity systems, as a sector, are virtually nonexistent.  
Statistical data and policy analysis indicates significant system degradation.  Network 
analysis is needed to model major components of the overall system so that 
vulnerabilities can be clearly identified and resources effectively managed.  Formal 
observation of this sector would allow federal funding to be allocated and would assign 
federal agencies to develop a sector-specific plan. 
U.S. national security depends on stronger identity systems.  Passports and 
driver’s licenses are important token identifiers that have been significantly undermined 
by theft and fraud.  Securing these systems from terrorists and criminal organizations 
would constitute an all-hazards approach to national security.  Recommendations for 
increasing security must take into account the basic functions of all identity systems.  
C. IDENTIFY, AUTHENTICATE, AUTHORIZE228 
Identity systems, as a meta-sector or stand-alone sector of critical infrastructure, 
are expected to perform three basic functions.  They should identify, authenticate, and 
authorize.  Figure 4 depicts the interaction of these functions. 
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Figure 4.   Identify, Authenticate, and Authorize Diagram 
The first step in any identity system is identification or “the act [or process] of 
recognizing or establishing as being a particular person.”229  In small groups, individuals 
are distinguished visually or by name.230  In larger complex systems, transactions must 
take place between persons who have never met.  A name and account number, or similar 
combination of specific identifiers helps prevent misidentification between persons with 
the same name.  Transactions in identity systems begin when a person expresses, “This is 
who I am, and this is what I want.” 
Authentication is the second process whereby identity is verified.  This can be 
accomplished by something a person knows (knowledge-based), something he has 
(token-based), or something he is (biometric).231  Knowledge-based identifiers are 
passwords or information that should be unique to the presented identity.  Pharmacists 
always ask for name and birth date when customers pick up prescriptions.  Chances are 
                                                 
229 Clarke, “Human Identification in Information Systems: Management Challenge and Public Policy 
Issues,” 7. 
230 Schneier, Beyond Fear, 186. 
231 Ibid. 
 58 
good that only one person with that particular combination of name and birth date will 
conduct business at that store.  However, there is always a possibility that another person 
could have the same combination or misrepresent themselves if they know the 
combination of identity and knowledge-based authentication of another person. 
Authentication is token-based when identity cards or physical items that confirm 
identity are used.  Driver’s licenses and passports are common token identifiers.  They 
contain information that can be verified to facilitate a particular transaction.  In order to 
purchase alcohol, a person must be able to prove he is over the age of 21.  A driver’s 
license is commonly used for this purpose.  Major portions of this thesis have shown that 
token-based identifiers are susceptible to manipulation or counterfeiting.   
Modern technology has increased the accuracy and specificity of the 
authentication process using biometrics.  Fingerprints, iris scanning, and facial 
recognition software offer an accurate authentication rate well in excess of 90%.  Unique 
physical identifiers are scanned, stored in a database, and then compared against 
subsequent scans.  The U.S.-VISIT system uses fingerprint technology for this purpose.  
However, the system can be undermined if a person successfully misrepresents his 
identity to authorities and his biometric data is associated with a fraudulent identity.   
The third function of identity systems is authorization.  After a person has been 
identified and authenticated, authorization determines the rights or privileges he is 
entitled to.  A driver’s license is a token that supports identity and authorizes that the 
bearer has the privilege to drive a motor vehicle.  A passport supports identity and 
authorizes the bearer to all rights and privileges bestowed to a citizen of its issuing 
nation.  Terrorists steal passports in order to create fraudulent tokens that misrepresent 
their true identity and grant authorizations such as access to target countries.   
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Figure 5.   Prototypical Credit Card Transaction 
Figure 5 diagrams a prototypical credit card transaction.  The customer identifies 
himself to a service provider and presents a credit card for payment.  The service provider 
authenticates the customer’s identity by checking the credit card against a picture ID.   
Correlation between the imprinted name on the credit card and photo ID is usually 
sufficient for most transactions.  The credit card company’s database is queried, funds are 
authorized, and the purchase is complete.  The customer is subsequently billed for all 
purchases made throughout the month. 
This description represents an ideal scenario.  Most service providers choose to 
bypass authenticating credit cards against a photo ID because this step inconveniences the 
customer.  They presume that the majority of transactions are legitimate and accept risk 
by not checking authenticating all payments.  Profit motives dictate that the speed of the 
transaction is more important than accuracy.  Losses are estimated and factored into 
costs.   Systems that do not identify, authenticate, and authorize, are susceptible to fraud. 
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Figure 6.   Identity Theft and Victimization 
Identity theft occurs when an imposter successfully hacks one or more 
components of an identity system.  Figure 6 describes the fraudulent acquisition of credit 
using stolen information.  An imposter identifies himself as using a victim’s information.  
Credit is issued in the victim’s name after the lending company fails to properly 
authenticate the imposter applicant.  Purchases accumulate and the victim is billed.  If the 
victim’s address is not used on the credit application, the account could be sent to 
collections and reported to the credit bureaus without the victim ever knowing. 
This scenario is repeated thousands of times per year.  Once a victim is aware his 
information is compromised, he is essentially powerless to prevent it from being used.  
The credit bureaus offer a 90 day credit alert that should flag the account and require a 
lender to contact the account holder before issuing credit.  But this action is voluntary and 
the lenders would rather assume risk than inhibit a transaction.   
These scenarios show the importance of interlacing processes in identity 
networks.  Authentication is time consuming and difficult.  Service providers choose to 
assume risk in order to increase the volume of transactions and decrease customer 
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inconvenience.  This level of risk is unacceptable in the international travel system.  
Homeland security enterprises require resilient identity systems that are effective and 
efficient. 
Identity systems should be analyzed as a critical infrastructure.  The process to 
identify, authenticate, and authorize is a sector-specific framework that is used to locate 
faults and provide greater resolution of system function.  This framework enhances 
existing critical infrastructure terminology and increases its relevance to identity systems. 
D. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE WAY AHEAD 
Identity systems are hacked when persons misrepresent themselves and receive 
authorizations that they are not entitled to.    All three functions of identity systems must 
work in concert to protect the integrity of the system.  Layering identity techniques and 
systems decreases the chances for failure and increases resiliency.  This thesis 
demonstrates that many identity systems do not meet these criteria.   
Passport issuance, for example, is lacking an authentication mechanism.  DoS 
officials have accepted fraudulent token identifiers (i.e., birth certificates, driver’s 
licenses) and issued passports because of bureaucratic and technical limitations on 
information sharing.232  Both barriers can be theoretically breached, but would require 
significant financial and political support.  Formalizing identity systems as a critical 
infrastructure sector is an important step towards this goal.  Standardizing identity issuing 
and verification procedures is needed to increase reliability of authentication tokens.  
The REAL ID act of 2005 requires states to meet minimum standards for issuing 
driver’s licenses and ID cards.  Applicants must present multiple breeder documents that 
must all be verified.  Security infrastructure must be in place to deter issuing authorities 
from corrupt behavior.  Databases must be interoperable from state-to-state to facilitate 
data verification.  All information systems must be protected with encryption software to 
prevent hackers from gaining access to personal records.  REAL ID standards should be 
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comprehensively and universally implemented.  States that refuse to comply or reallocate 
DHS funding should be punitively punished by withholding federal funds.  Homeland 
security is contingent upon secure ID issuing procedures. 
Increasing interoperability by connecting state information databases is an 
important component of REAL ID, but one that creates a new threat.  State employees 
would suddenly have access to significantly more information than ever before.  
Increasing system utility also makes the system a more appealing target for thieves.  
Access to an interstate database should be restricted to as few persons as possible.  These 
trusted few should be subject to an extensive background and credit check, similar to 
those seeking a security clearance in the U.S. military.  Information compartmentalization 
and two-person integrity are effective methods for ensuring database access is not 
misused. 
REAL ID standards significantly increase the reliability of genuine authentication 
tokens.  However, quality fraudulent documents are widely available from multiple 
sources.  No single authentication token should be accepted as proof of identity for most 
transactions.  Relying on a single token for authentication constitutes a brittle system.  
Verification mechanisms must be built into the system to check identity tokens against 
databases.  For instance, airport security personnel should have the capability to swipe 
any driver’s license and instantly have the accompanying state record displayed.  This 
type of system dramatically decreases the utility of a fraudulent ID token since security 
personnel can immediately compare the traveler’s appearance with the token picture, and 
picture on file.  Restricting system access by removing active search capability prevents 
records from arbitrary searches, preventing misuse. 
Government-maintained identity databases carry particular importance because of 
the authorizations they provide, but businesses maintain the vast majority of personal 
information.  The average consumer has no insight as to the quality of identity system 
management with a company.  The Federal Trade Commission should develop a 
voluntary annual certification process for participating businesses.  A scalar system 
would give consumers ratings to compare before divulging personal information.  
Conversely, businesses would have incentive to acquire a certification and the highest 
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possible rating.  This system would take advantage of market competition to strengthen 
information systems and overall economic security.   
E. CONCLUSION 
Identity management systems meet the prima facie elements for critical 
infrastructure.  Protection of these systems is essential to homeland and economic 
security.  A layered approach to security is essential to strengthen the functions of the 
system.  Policy options to strengthen systems need to be effective and efficient.  
Analyzing identity management systems as a critical infrastructure provides the 
framework necessary to make informed policy decisions. 
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